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MODELLING ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF AGRICULTURE 
THE CASE OF ORGANIC RYE AND GREY PARTRIDGE 
 
Abstract 
Our optimal control model identifies economic reasons as to why farmland bird populations have 
dramatically declined in modern agricultural landscapes. By integrating recreational wildlife values 
into farm level decision-making on arable crop choice and herbicide use, we derive those economic 
instruments needed for creating suitable conditions for game bird species on farmland. Based on the 
Finnish data available on the grey partridge (Perdix perdix), we illustrate how the optimal acreage 
subsidy for organically-grown areas, herbicide tax rates and the hunting licence fee could be estimated 
in monetary terms. Finally, we discuss the benefits and costs of cultivating organic cereals which will 
enhance preservation of the grey partridge. 
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1. Introduction 
The positive environmental benefits of agriculture include preservation of such public goods as 
farmland biodiversity and agricultural landscapes. However, agricultural intensification and 
specialisation, along with the decline of livestock farming and the cultivation of winter cereals have 
clearly caused the loss of wildlife habitats. An alarming indicator for biodiversity in agricultural 
ecosystems is the decreasing abundance of farmland birds. In particular, the grey partridge (Perdix 
perdix), a typical game bird of open arable landscapes, has been adversely affected by the 
modification of the agricultural landscape. Since the 1930s European grey partridge populations have 
declined remarkably, and the bird is currently listed among species with an unfavourable conservation 
status. (Hietala-Koivu, 2002; Miettinen et al., 2004; Pimentel and Greiner, 1997; Heath and Rayment, 
2003; Potts, 1986; De Leo et al., 2004; Hagemeijer and Blair, 1997). 
  As rapid changes in land use curtail environmental benefits, effective measures to conserve 
wildlife in agricultural areas become necessary (see, e.g., Lowe and Whitby, 1997). In this paper, we 
address the positive and negative effects of cereals cultivation and the associated economic costs of 
environmentally benign agricultural practices. We utilise the grey partridge stock as a biodiversity 
indicator for illustrating the effects of the crops and herbicides the farmers choose to use. In our 
framework, we also take into account hunters’ recreational hunting decisions, and the fact that the 
partridge stock provides welfare beyond simply recreational hunting. 
  There is an extensive and increasing volume of literature concerning agri-environmental schemes 
and policies for multifunctional agriculture (e.g., Dobbs and Pretty, 2004). For example, Boisvert 
(2001) examined the implications of joint production of private and public goods in farm production, 
in which two agricultural commodities are produced along with landscape amenities and an 
environmental residual. In addition, management of biodiversity aspects are increasingly considered in 
the analyses (e.g., van Wenum et al., 2004). However, there are few economic studies analysing the 
dynamics of bird species in this context despite the wide use of farmland birds as biodiversity 
indicators. The most closely related approach to ours originates from the study by Hammack and 
Brown (1974) who investigated the optimal allocation of the prairie wetlands in North America. They 
analysed the conflicting economic and ecological interests when the drainage of marshes and ponds 
increases the supply of arable land, and eliminates the costs of tilling around potholes, but at the same 
time decreases the nesting areas and the stock of waterfowl. Our modelling owes much to the inspiring 
work of Hammack and Brown, and to other studies on unpriced environmental input where the   2
ecological function affects the growth rate of a renewable stock over time (e.g. a wetland supporting a 
fishery as outlined in Barbier and Strand 1998, and Barbier 2000; see also Ellis and Fisher 1987). The 
main contribution of our application is on elaborating economic incentives to achieve a socially 
optimal level of a bird species and corresponding input uses in crop production. 
  In our model, the environmental externalities lead to a socially inefficient allocation of arable 
land, non-optimal use of herbicides and over-exploitation of partridge stock, since private valuations 
of inputs and outputs are different from their social valuations. We develop first-best policy 
instruments to internalise bird fauna values in farm level decision making. To date the pricing of 
biodiversity has focused on the valuation of individual species using contingent valuation and other 
methods of stated preferences (Montgomery et al., 1999, Loomis and White 1996). The results of our 
empirical illustration show that government intervention can be justified even with conservative value 
estimates of game birds. 
  The paper is structured as follows. We develop a framework of cereals cultivation and partridge 
hunting, and study how the government may intervene optimally by subsidising organic crop farming, 
taxing herbicide use and imposing a hunting licence fee in such a way that the externalities are 
internalised. We introduce some background information on both the cultivation of winter cereals and 
on grey partridges in Finland to provide an empirical illustration of the use of biodiversity values in 
the design of individual policy measures. The framework applied and empirical results give useful 
insights into the ongoing process of shaping policies to implement and improve agri-environmental 
schemes in the EU. 
 
2. Analytical framework 
In this section, we introduce a theoretical framework for crop production and partridge hunting. First, 
we study the underlying assumptions, find the social and private optima of arable land allocation, farm 
capital investments, herbicide use and partridge hunting bag. 
  Let us assume that the total area of homogenous agricultural land in the economy is A, which is a 
constant upper limit on land for farming in the long run. The social planner allocates agricultural land 
between two bread grain cereal crops. Crop 1 is organically-grown rye and crop 2 is spring wheat. 
Both variables are functions of continuous time, but we suppress the time argument (t) and denote the 
area devoted to crop 1 by  1 a  and the area devoted to crop 2 by  . 2 a  By assuming that all fixed amounts 
of agricultural land are used at any time, we have  . 2 1 A a a = +  This assumption implies that the price 
or rental value of land will be captured by the Lagrangian multiplier for the land constraint in the 
optimisation problem. 
  The dynamic production function of organic crop 1,  ), , ( 1 1 1 K a f y =  is assumed to be strictly 
concave with respect to  1 a  and  1 K . Sector-specific know-how and (human) capital invested in the 
chosen agricultural technology, organic or conventional, is denoted by  i K  (i = 1,2). The production 
function of conventional crop 2,  ), , , ( 2 2 2 h K a g y =  contains three arguments. The last of these, h, 
represents the amount of herbicides used in weed control. The marginal products of all three inputs are 
assumed to be positive and diminishing. 
  Capital formation and (gross) investment,  i I , are related by the following differential equation 
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where  , /dt dK K i i = &  and δ represents the constant depreciation rate of capital. The cost of an 
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product and factor markets, and we denote the market price of crop 1 by  ,
1 p  the market price of crop 
2 by  ,
2 p  and the unit price of herbicide by  .
h p    3
  We assume that the herbicide damage is a flow variable, i.e., that herbicide residues do not 
accumulate in the environment and build up into a persistent stock. Direct adverse effects of herbicides 
to humans, typically poisonings and related illnesses, are denoted by D(h), which is the monetary 
equivalent of the disutility. The social costs of herbicide use in agriculture to human well-being may 
also include consumers’ disutility from the potential risk of herbicide residues in food, water and the 
atmosphere (Pimentel and Greiner, 1997). It is assumed that an increase in the use of herbicides in 
crop production generates direct disutility at an increasing rate. Therefore we have  0 ) ( > ⋅ h D  and 
. 0 ) ( > ⋅ hh D  In addition, indirect effects from the use of herbicides are also considered. We assume that 
the use of herbicides in weed control reduces the growth rate of partridge stock, because herbicides 
decrease the supply of insect food and increase partridge chick mortality (Potts, 1986). 
  The partridge stock is replenished by growth, which depends positively on the size of the 
partridge population, B, and the area under organic rye (crop 1), and negatively on the amount of 
herbicides used. The bird stock is reduced by hunting. The amount of partridges shot is denoted by X. 
Furthermore, the parameter α measures the constant natural mortality rate of partridges. The 
relationships above can be summarised as 
 
B X h a B e B α − − = ) , , ( 1 &  
 
where ) (⋅ e  denotes the natural production function with  , 0 ) ( > ⋅ B e  , 0 ) (
1 > ⋅ a e  and  . 0 ) ( < ⋅ h e  
  We assume that hunters generate their recreational hunting experience. The amount of partridges 
shot is X. The variable also measures the amount of partridge bag, since we assume that the proportion 
of birds shot but not retrieved is negligible. The net benefits of recreational partridge hunting are given 
in monetary units by 
 
X B c X p
X R ) ( −  
 
where 
R p is a total hunting value attributed to a bagged partridge. The total hunting value consists 
mainly of recreational benefits that are typically much larger than the value of meat received from the 
hunting bag. The unit hunting cost,  ), (B c
X  depends negatively on the size of the partridge stock, B, 
since hunters must allocate more time and effort when the partridge population is low (cf. Clark and 
Munro, 1975). Therefore we have  0 ) ( < ⋅
X
B c  and  . 0 ) ( < ⋅
X
BB c  Thus, the net hunting benefits increase as 
the bird stock increases. 
  Since many people who do not hunt may value and derive utility from the continued presence of 
partridges, we assume that the partridge stock provides welfare above and beyond hunting. The non-
use values attached to the stock of partridges are given in monetary units by the function W(B). 
Furthermore, we assume that  0 ) ( > ⋅ B W  and  . 0 ) ( < ⋅ BB W  
 
2.1 Social planner’s problem 
The objective of the social planner is to maximise discounted social welfare by allocating the arable 
area between crops optimally, finding the optimal investments and choosing the optimal amounts of 
herbicide used and partridges shot 
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Thus there are six control variables,  , 1 a   , 2 a   ), 2 , 1 ( = i Ii  h, and X, and three state variables, the stock 
of capital, Ki (i = 1,2), and the stock of partridges, B, in the optimal control model above. ρ (≥ 0) is the 
rate of discount,  0 i K  refers to the initial stock of sector specific capital, and  0 B  denotes the given 
initial size of the partridge population. 
  The current-value Lagrangian function (i.e. the current-value Hamiltonian augmented 
with the constraint  A a a = + 2 1 ) is 
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where l is the shadow price of capital, m is the shadow price of partridge stock B, and the Lagrangian 
multiplier n is the shadow price of arable land A. 
  The maximum-principle conditions are 
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including the equations of motion for the state and the costate variables 
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plus the infinite-horizon transversality conditions (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987) 
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We assume interior solutions and focus on their interpretation. Rearranging the first two maximum-
principle conditions (equations (1) and (2)) yields the following socially optimal arable land allocation 
 
) ( ) ( ) (
2 1 1
2 1 ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ a a a g p me f p  
 
Thus at the social optimum, when both crops are cultivated, the sum of the values of marginal 
products of arable area devoted to the production of crop 1 and partridges is equal to the value of the 
marginal product of arable land under crop 2.   5
  Equation (3) directs increasing the investments up to the point where the marginal adjustment 
cost is equal to the shadow price of capital. Equation (4) shows that at the social optimum, the value of 
marginal product of herbicide used net of the marginal social damages done and partridge growth loss 
incurred equals the unit price of herbicide, i.e., the marginal cost. Finally, equation (5) implicates that 
the social planner should increase the hunting bag to the point where the net benefits of recreational 
hunting are equal to the marginal current value of an additional partridge. 
  The steady state for capital stocks is characterised by the equality of investment and depreciation 
of farm equipment capital. Respectively, when  , 0 / = dt dB  equation (7) can be written as 
, ) ( B X e α + = ⋅  implicating simply that the biological growth and reduction rates of the partridge stock 
are equal in the steady state. Furthermore, when  , 0 / = dt dl  the equation of motion for the costate 
variable l can be written as  ) ( ) ( ) (
2 1
2 1 ⋅ + ⋅ = + K K g p f p l ρ δ  implicating that the marginal user cost of 
capital should be equal to the value of the marginal product of farm capital. Finally, when  , 0 / = dt dm  
equation (9) can be solved for m, i.e. 
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which implicates that in the steady state the shadow price of partridge stock, m, is equal to the ratio 
between the marginal contribution of partridge stock to current social welfare,  , ) ( ) ( X c W
X
B B ⋅ − ⋅  and 
the marginal contribution of partridge stock to future social welfare,  ). (⋅ − + B e α ρ  From (5) we have 
) (B c p m
X R − = . If we make this substitution into equation (9), we have in the optimal steady state 
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The left-hand side of the equation (10) can be considered as the marginal opportunity cost of not 
hunting. The right-hand side consists of the marginal incentives to postpone hunting, which include 
partridge capital gains,  )], ( )[ ( ⋅ − ⋅
X R
B c p e  the marginal decrease in unit hunting cost due to increased 
partridge stock,  , ) ( X c
X
B ⋅  and the marginal welfare effect of the increased partridge stock,  ). (⋅ B W  
Because of the accumulation phenomenon, the instantaneous incentives have to be discounted by 
dividing with the sum of the rate of discount and the natural mortality rate,  . α ρ +  
  Let us next differentiate  ) (B c p m
X R − =  with respect to time to get  B B c m
X
B & & ) ( − = . Equating 
this expression with (9) and substituting  ) (B c p
X R −  for m yields 
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which, when simplified and rearranged, gives 
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and with  B e x α − ⋅ = ) (  defines the modified golden-rule value of the socially optimal steady-state 
partridge stock B. The equation (11) states that the rate of discount, ρ, equals the own rate of return of 
the partridge stock. The latter consists of two components: the net marginal productivity of the 
resource stock,  , ) ( α − ⋅ B e  and the marginal stock effect, which also consists of two components. The 
components of the marginal stock effect are the decreased unit hunting cost,   6
)], ( /[ ] ) ( )[ ( ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅
X R X
B c p B e c α  and increased social welfare from the stock benefits, 
)]. ( /[ ) ( ⋅ − ⋅
X R
B c p W  Thus, the hunting rate is socially optimal when the net product of the partridge 
stock is equal to the discount rate. 
 
2.2 Representative farmer’s private optimum 
In this section, we consider a representative farmer whose objective is to maximise profit from the 
cultivation of arable crops. The profit maximisation problem of the farmer is thus 
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The current-value Lagrangian function is 
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and the maximum-principle conditions are 
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The maximum-principle condition (14) indicates that the optimal investment in farm equipment, and 
thus the optimal capital path, is the same as at the social optimum (cf. equation (3)). Instead, the 
maximum-principle conditions for a farmer’s use of arable land and of herbicides differ from the 
social optimum, because the representative farmer does not take into account the beneficial 
environmental effects of rye cultivation nor the adverse effects of herbicides. This can be seen by 
comparing the equations (12), (13) and (15) with equations (1), (2) and (4). 
 
2.3 Representative hunter’s private optimum 
Game populations are regulated using closed seasons and hunting can be scaled in accordance with 
game stocks. Here, we assume that hunters act as sole owners of the partridge stock, and that they 
maximise the net hunting benefits. The maximisation problem of the representative hunter is thus 
 
[] dt e X B c X p Max
t X R ρ −
∞
∫ −
0
) (  
. ) 0 ( and ) , , ( . . 0 1 B B B X h a B e B t s = − − = α &  
 
The current-value Hamiltonian function is   7
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and the maximum-principle conditions are 
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When comparing the above maximum-principle conditions with the maximum-principle conditions of 
the social planner, there exists a difference between equations (9) and (20) because hunters do not take 
into account the fact that the natural biological stock also provides economic welfare to society above 
and beyond hunting,  ). (B W  Therefore, we indicate the shadow price of the partridge stock in the 
representative hunter’s private solution with  .
H m  
 
2.4 Corrected solutions 
In this section, we use market-based instruments to correct the externalities. There are three 
externalities in the framework presented: 1) The cultivation of rye positively affects the growth rate of 
the partridge stock. 2) The use of herbicides in crop production negatively affects the growth rate of 
the partridge stock and causes damage and disutility to humans. 3) Recreational hunting excessively 
reduces the level of the partridge stock and leads to loss of stock benefits. 
  By comparing the farmer’s private optimum with the social optimum, one may notice that the 
area under crop 1 is too small from a social point of view. Therefore, the government may subsidise 
the production of crop 1 and impose the crop-specific area payment s. Furthermore, when finding the 
private optimum, the farmer also neglects the social costs engendered by herbicide use. The social 
damages can be internalised by imposing a Pigouvian tax, t, to a farmer’s use of herbicides. 
  In the presence of acreage subsidy, s, and Pigouvian tax, t, the current-value Lagrangian function 
of the representative farmer’s maximisation problem becomes 
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and the relevant maximum-principle conditions are 
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By comparing the equations (21) – (23) with the corresponding maximum-principle conditions of the 
social optimum (1), (2) and (4), it is self-evident that the level of the acreage subsidy, s, depends on 
the product of the shadow price of the partridge stock and the marginal growth effect of  . 1 a  Therefore, 
the socially optimal subsidy for the rye acreage has to be 
 
) (
1 ⋅ = a me s   (24)
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The similar reasoning results in that the optimal herbicide tax rate has to equal 
 
) ( ) ( ⋅ − ⋅ = h h me D t   (25)
 
The herbicide tax internalises both direct and indirect effects of herbicide use. The latter consists of 
the reduced partridge productivity caused by the herbicides and it is weighted with the shadow price of 
the partridge stock. Furthermore, it is important to note that both the optimal first-best acreage subsidy 
and the first-best herbicide tax change over time, because they are functions of the shadow price of the 
partridge stock, m. 
  Let us next consider the representative hunter’s private optimum. We know from the maximum-
principle condition (18) that hunters increase harvesting to the point where  . ) (
H X R m c p = ⋅ −  
Substituting the above result into (20), yields in the steady state 
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Since ) (⋅ B W  is not accounted for by hunters, the marginal benefits of delaying hunting are smaller 
compared with equation (10). For this reason the steady-state partridge stock, the size of which is 
defined in the equation 
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is too small compared with the social optimum, which is defined by the equation (11) and the steady-
state hunting bag,  , ) ( B e x α − ⋅ =  is thus unoptimally large. 
  To prevent over-exploitation of the partridge stock, the government may introduce a hunting 
licence fee, z, for the hunter, after which the hunter’s current-value Hamiltonian function becomes 
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The maximum-principle conditions are 
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After substituting  z c p m
X R H − ⋅ − = ) (  into (29), we have in the steady state 
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Thus it is easy to see by comparing (30) with (10) that the partridge hunting fee is made internal to the 
representative hunter’s decision, if we set 
   9
α ρ +
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i.e., the hunting licence fee equals the present value of the marginal stock benefits. 
 
3. Empirical illustration 
In this section, we demonstrate our analytical findings with an empirical illustration of the impacts of 
farming decisions on the grey partridge population in Finland. First, we give some background on the 
grey partridge and the cultivation of rye in Finland. Second, we discuss the population dynamics of the 
grey partridge by developing a physical balance equation to illustrate grey partridge population 
relationships. We utilise previous valuation studies to approximate the use value of a bagged partridge 
and the non-use value of a partridge stock in monetary terms to find suitable estimates for m and 
). (⋅ B W  Our ultimate purpose is to assess the components of those policy instruments derived in the 
previous section to gain insight into how to estimate, in monetary terms, the optimal rye acreage 
subsidy and herbicide tax rates and the hunting licence fee. Finally, we discuss the benefits and costs 
of organic rye cultivation which enhances the preservation of the grey partridge. 
 
3.1 Background 
Today, the grey partridge is classified as a near-threatened species in Finland (Rassi et al., 2001). If no 
additional measures are taken, it is predicted that the current agricultural policies will lead to further 
decline in the species. The present size of the breeding population is 4,000 pairs, and the winter 
population is approximately 20,000 individuals. In the 1950s, the size of the breeding partridge stock 
was estimated to be 15,000 pairs (Väisänen et al., 1998). The reasons for the decline of the species in 
Finland include reductions in the area under winter cereals as well as adverse effects of agricultural 
pesticides which decrease the supply of insect food and increase chick mortality. The range of the grey 
partridge covers the west coast of Finland and the southern and south-western parts of Finland. 
(Tiainen and Pakkala, 1996) 
  In Finland, there are nearly 300,000 registered hunters, which is a total of 6% of the Finnish 
population. Hunters belong to hunting clubs which lease land and water areas for hunting. Leases are 
often nominal. Land owners and hunting clubs grant or sell hunting permits for areas in their 
possession. For state-owned lands, hunting permits are sold by the Finnish Forest and Park Service. In 
northernmost Finland, local inhabitants have free hunting rights on public lands. Moose and deer 
hunters must purchase a hunting licence. (Hunters’ Central Organisation, 2004). There are regional 
restrictions on partridge hunting, and hunting is concentrated in western Finland. According to 
statistics produced by the Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute (2004), the size of the annual 
partridge bag has been approximately 1,000 kg in the past twenty years. 
  Rye is a winter cereal and its shoots provide grey partridges, pheasants and brown hares with 
vegetation during winter and early spring (Lindén et al., 1996). In contrast to central and western 
Europe, winter cereal fields in Finland provide better habitats for farmland birds than spring cereal 
fields. This is because the vegetation in Finnish winter cereal fields is sparse and low during the 
breeding season of birds (Piha et al., 2003). In addition, rye is suitable for organic farming in which 
chemical pesticides and fertilisers are not used at all. In 2002, over 20% of Finland's rye area was 
organically farmed (Plant Production Inspection Centre, 2003). Also the need for herbicides in 
conventionally farmed rye fields is smaller than, for example, in spring wheat fields, because winter 
cereal fields have fewer weeds than spring cereal or hay fields (Raatikainen et al., 1978). This benefits 
the environment, since herbicides also reduce the availability of food for invertebrates and birds. 
  Although the cultivation of rye provides several environmental benefits as described above, 
Finnish farmers typically incur relatively high opportunity costs if they cultivate rye. This is because 
the producer price for rye has not been significantly higher compared to prices for other cereals, and 
the per-hectare yields in rye production have been smaller than, for example, in spring wheat 
production. Furthermore, the risk of crop failure is higher in winter cereal production than in spring 
cereal production. Since those farmers who cultivate rye bear the costs of producing positive   10
environmental effects but do not share the benefits, they do not have an economic incentive to 
cultivate rye. The lack of incentives reduces the rye area and may also decrease crop diversity, not to 
mention the partridge stock and hunters’ partridge bags. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the arable 
area under rye in Finland in past decades has typically been less than 3% of the total cereal area 
(Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2003). Furthermore, as a result of the 
CAP reform, agreed on June 2003 in Luxembourg, rye will be excluded from the intervention system 
of the European Union (Council, 2003). According to Lehtonen et al. (2004), this will make rye a 
relatively unprofitable crop to cultivate in Finland if no other production-linked support for rye is 
established. 
 
3.2 Physical balance equation 
Bearing in mind that we assumed earlier the following equation of motion for the partridge stock 
 
B X h a B e B α − − = ) , , ( 1 &  
 
We modify the production function to explicitly include the size of the breeding population  . ) 1 ( B α −  
 
( ) B X h a B e B α α − − − = , , ) 1 ( 1 &  
 
Hence B is the size of the winter population and parameter α now measures the overwinter mortality 
rate of partridges. 
  To provide a solution for the annual net production of grey partridges, we assume that the 
partridge stock is currently in the long run equilibrium (i.e. 0 = B & ). The size of the steady-state 
(winter) population,  ,
s B  in Finland is currently 20,000 birds (Väisänen et al., 1998). We assume that 
the overwinter mortality of partridges is 0.60. This is a moderate mortality rate compared to Potts 
(1986) who reported  . 76 . 0 = α  The size of the breeding population is 8,000 
] 000 , 20 4 . 0 ) 1 ( [ × = − =
s B α  birds and the number of breeding pairs is simply assumed to be 4,000. In 
recent years, the annual partridge bag, X, has been approximately 2,000 birds (Finnish Game and 
Fisheries Institute). If 12,000 partridges die during the winter and 2,000 are killed by hunters, the 
annual net production of partridges has to be 14,000 in order to maintain the balance. 
  For future reference, we assume that each pair has an average of seven chicks of which half will 
survive. Hence in the steady state the annual net production of partridges is  000 , 14 ) 7 000 , 4 ( 5 . 0 = × ×  
and the gross production is 28,000 immature birds. 
 
3.3 Valuation of grey partridges 
Since there is no market price for a grey partridge, the minimum value of a bagged partridge is 
assumed to be €5. This estimate is based on the statistics of the Finnish Game and Fisheries Institute 
reporting annually the calculatory values of annual hunting bags. The basis for valuation is the value 
of the meat received from the hunting bag, and this can be used as a minimum estimate for economic 
value. 
  Besides the value of meat, hunting has a significant recreational component. Using the contingent 
valuation method, Ovaskainen et al. (1992) found that the value of meat accounted for only 11-12% of 
the total hunting value of grouse (Tetraonidae) in Finland. If this is generally true for all Finnish game 
birds, the recreational value of a bagged partridge would be about €45. Also, the existence value 
derived from the very presence of grey partridges might be significant, since the grey partridge is 
classified as a near-threatened species in Finland, but without any research results it is difficult to 
estimate how much people would be willing to pay to ensure the continued presence of the grey 
partridge. Our upper limit for the total hunting value of a grey partridge is thus €45.   11
 
3.4 Optimal policy instruments 
 
Rye subsidy rate 
In the natural production function of grey partridges,  ( ), , , ) 1 ( 1 h a B e α −  the area under rye,  , 1 a  
supports the growth of the grey partridge population. In the distribution area of grey partridges, the 
average area under rye has been approximately 18,300 hectares during 1995-2003. Therefore one 
additional rye hectare increases the annual net production of grey partridges (14,000 birds) on average 
by 8 . 0 300 , 18 / 000 , 14 ) (
1 ≈ = ⋅ a e bird/ha. This corresponds well with the documented partridge density 
in the UK during the first half of the 20
th century when herbicides and pesticides were not used 
intensively (De Leo et al., 2004). Given our earlier assumption that the shadow price of an additional 
partridge lies between €5 to €45 per bird, we can approximate the optimal support to be 
 
36 4 8 . 0 ) 45 5 ( ) (
1 → = × → = ⋅ = a me s   (24´)
 
The per hectare support to rye should be €4-36 /ha depending on the value of the grey partridge. 
 
Herbicide tax rate 
Let us then suppose that the use of pesticides in Finland has been completely abolished. We assume 
that as a result of this, the fraction of immature birds that survive will increase from 0.5 to 0.6. This is 
based on a Danish study (Hald (2002) referred in Schou et al., 2002) according to which even 6 metre 
wide pesticide free margins in cereal fields increase the survival of partridge chicks by 10 percentage 
points. 
  The net production of partridges will, in the following year, increase from 14,000 birds to 16,800 
birds (i.e. by 2,800 partridges per annum) as a result of the increase in the survival fraction. In per 
hectare terms this yields  15 . 0 300 , 18 / 800 , 2 ) ( ≈ = ⋅ h e bird/ha. Furthermore, according to Siikamäki 
(1997), a Finnish consumer would be willing to pay annually €69 if the use of pesticides in agriculture 
was completely abolished. The total willingness to pay is then approximately €250 million. Since the 
total arable land area under cultivation in Finland is about 2.2 million hectares, this yields 
114 ) ( = ⋅ h D €/ha. Therefore, the herbicide tax rate per hectare 
 
[ ] 75 . 120 75 . 114 15 . 0 ) 45 5 ( 114 ) ( ) ( → = × → + = ⋅ − ⋅ = h h me D t   (25´)
 
lies within the range of 115 €/ha and 121 €/ha depending on the partridge value. 
 
Optimal hunting licence fee 
The value of grey partridges to humans includes stock benefits, which are sensitive to changes in the 
total size of the population. We showed earlier that the optimal hunting licence fee equals the present 
value of the marginal stock benefits. Hence the hunting licence fee is 8 to 69 €/bird. 
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All in all, we have been able to value, in monetary terms, the socially optimal policy instruments 
needed for correcting for the market optimum. We are fully aware that we have made certain bold 
assumptions to derive the results, but our purpose has been to show how the process of choosing the 
optimal levels for policy instruments should be carried out if authorities were considering intervention. 
This procedure is applicable for many components of agri-environmental support schemes 
implemented throughout the European Union.   12
 
Evaluation of non-market benefits and opportunity costs of organic rye cultivation 
Using the figures derived above we can summarise the non-market benefits of organic rye cultivation 
supporting the grey partridge population as depicted in Table 1. It must be remembered that we 
assume the average area under organic rye yields roughly one bird (0.8 + 0.15) per hectare. 
 
Table 1. Per hectare non-market benefits of organic rye cultivation (€/ha) 
Value of a rye hectare supporting grey partridge hunting 
if the use of pesticides in agriculture is abolished 
 
€5 – 43/ha 
 
Consumers’ willingness to pay for the abolishing of the use of pesticides in 
agriculture
a 
 
€114/ha 
aSiikamäki, 1997 (Includes other values than the valuation of impacts on the grey partridge stock). 
 
The non-market benefits should be compared with the opportunity costs of organic rye cultivation. 
The average producer prices of rye and spring wheat have been almost equal during Finland's EU 
membership. However, there has been a big difference between the productivity of these two cereals. 
During 1995-2003, the average market price of wheat (converted into the price level for 2000 by the 
agricultural price index, cereals) has been  €141.15 per tonne. In the same period, the average market 
price of rye has been €140.96/tonne. In the distribution area of grey partridges, the average annual per 
hectare yield of spring wheat (weighted by regional output volumes) has been 3,328kg/ha. The 
corresponding figure for rye is 2,359kg/ha. Since, according to the statistics produced by the Plant 
Production Inspection Centre, the hectare yields of rye in organic production during 1999-2002 have 
been approximately 67% of the yields in conventional production, we assume that the hectare yield of 
rye in organic production is 1,573kg/ha. As both the price and the average per hectare yield of spring 
wheat are higher than those for rye, the farmer loses sales revenues amounting to €240 per hectare if 
he cultivates organic rye instead of conventionally cultivated spring wheat. Similarly, the opportunity 
cost is € 110, if organic rye is compared with conventional rye. 
  The calculated opportunity cost of €110-240 is an upper bound for opportunity costs, because the 
annual support for organic production has been €102.59ha
-1 following a two-year conversion period. 
Given the consumers’ strong support for organic farming measured by their willingness to pay 
(Siikamäki 1997) the subsidy seems to be well justified if the benefits received from grey partridge 
hunting are included as well. In fact, since rye fields also offer food and shelter to pheasants and 
brown hares, one should also include the benefits received from those species when evaluating the 
welfare contribution of organic rye cultivation. However, one should be careful not to double-count 
the benefits when valuing individual species separately. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We investigated the link between agricultural production and commodity and non-commodity outputs 
of agricultural production. By using the dynamic framework, we showed that the uncontrolled 
economy leads to too small a cultivation area of rye, an excessive use of herbicides in weed control, 
and overly large partridge hunting bags, compared to the socially optimal situation. The area under rye 
remains too small because farmers, when making their crop choices, do not consider that rye 
cultivation adds social welfare by increasing the reproduction rate of the partridge stock, from which 
humans derive welfare. Equally, farmers also ignore the harmful effects of herbicides. This implies 
welfare losses in the form of direct adverse effects to humans and reductions in hunting bags, as well 
as in other benefits derived from the partridge stock, because herbicides decrease the biological 
growth of the partridge population. We also demonstrated that the private optimum is realised at the 
lower partridge stock level and the hunting rate is excessively high, because hunters maximise their 
net recreational hunting benefits but do not cater for the stock benefits that accrue for society at large. 
  The above findings justify government intervention to internalise biodiversity benefits in the 
economic decision-making of farms. In Finland, the annual area support to organic production has 
been €102.59ha
-1 after a two-year conversion period. Our empirical illustration shows that the subsidy   13
per hectare seems to be well justified by the benefits derived from grey partridge hunting, given 
consumers’ overall support for organic farming. However, simply launching area support does not 
provide the proper incentives, so an input tax on herbicides is required. Hunting of the grey partridge 
should be controlled by hunting fee which would become very high when the size of the population 
approached a critically low, predetermined risk level. 
  In spite of recent pro-environmental change, the multifunctional character of agriculture 
necessitates lateral thinking for policymakers, because even a small change in agricultural support may 
sometimes significantly affect the provision of public goods from agriculture. Since the marginal value 
of the partridge stock is a function of time, optimal agri-environmental policy also includes dynamic 
characteristics. Therefore, the levels of subsidy and tax would vary according to the shadow price of 
the partridge stock. This feature adds complexity not only to the theoretical analyses, but also to agri-
environmental policy design and implementation. 
   14
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